A client calls to ask about the invoice you sent this morning, and you didn't send one. Someone has your mailbox. This is the order to work in today, written for a small office without a security team, on Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace.
Keep this page open and work down it. The first two sections take about an hour. Don't start writing to clients until the account is locked, or the attacker can read your apology and reply to it.
Changing the password alone is not enough. Attackers who got in through a fake login page usually hold a session cookie, which keeps them signed in after the password changes. Microsoft has documented phishing kits that sit between the victim and the real sign-in page and take that cookie, which gets past text-message and app MFA (Microsoft, 2022). So:
If nobody in the office has admin rights, call whoever set up your email (your IT provider or the person who registered the domain). This hour matters more than any other.
Attackers set things up so they keep receiving your mail, or so you don't see the replies to their fraud. Microsoft's own checklist for a compromised mailbox lists these places (Microsoft Learn):
Get-InboxRule -IncludeHidden.Check Sent Items and Deleted Items for the window the attacker had. Then check the server's own record, because attackers delete what they send: Message trace in the Microsoft Defender portal, or Email Log Search in the Google Admin console. Export the list of recipients. That is your contact list for the next step.
Note the sign-in log too (Entra sign-in logs, or the Google Admin audit log): the first sign-in from an unfamiliar country or IP gives you the start of the window.
Keep the message short and specific. A long explanation reads like another phishing email. Something like:
Between [date] and [date] someone got into [name]'s email account and sent messages that look like they came from us. If you received an invoice, payment request or link from us in that period, please don't act on it. We will never change our bank details by email. If anything about a payment looks different, call us on [number you already have on file].
Send it from a mailbox that wasn't affected, and phone your largest clients and anyone with a payment due this week. Phone calls are slower, but they are the only channel the attacker can't fake.
Business email compromise is where the losses are: the FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report puts reported US losses to it at just over $3 billion for the year. Most of it moves by wire or bank transfer, and speed is what gets it back.
If the mailbox held other people's personal information, such as client ID documents, health details, payroll or tax records, you may have a legal duty to notify them and a regulator. In the UK and EU that clock is 72 hours from when you become aware, under GDPR. US states and sector rules (HIPAA for healthcare, for example) have their own deadlines. If you have cyber insurance, call the insurer before you call anyone else: most policies cover the forensic review and the letters, and some require you to use their panel.
Look at how they got in. In most small-office cases it's one person typing their password into a page that looked like the Microsoft or Google sign-in, after an email about a shared document, a voicemail or an unpaid invoice.
I changed the password. Why is the attacker still sending email?
They are probably still signed in with a stolen session, or an inbox rule or connected app is acting for them. Revoke sessions (Microsoft 365) or reset sign-in cookies (Google Workspace), then check rules, forwarding and connected apps.
We had MFA turned on. How did they get in?
Modern phishing kits relay the real sign-in page, including the MFA prompt, and keep the session cookie the real site issues afterwards. Text-message codes and push approvals don't stop that. Passkeys and security keys do, because they only work on the genuine domain.
Should we email every contact in the address book?
Start with the people the attacker actually wrote to (from message trace or Email Log Search), anyone with a payment in progress, and your largest clients by phone. A mass email to every contact often causes more confusion than it prevents.
Do we have to report it?
If money was lost, report it to the police or IC3 as fast as you can, because that's what makes a recall possible. If personal data was in the mailbox, check your data-protection duties: 72 hours under GDPR in the UK and EU, and varying rules by US state and sector.
PhishClean checks login pages in the browser and warns before a password or card number is typed into a phishing page. Nothing about the pages people visit leaves the device. For a whole office, it can be rolled out by browser policy, with nothing for staff to set up.
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